Headcoverings and Modesty

Some posts by Matt and Sora reminded me of a recent discussion I was involved in concerning the use of headcoverings as a sign of modesty and submission for women in our culture. Is the headcovering meant to be a sign of these things forever and always? Here is a copy of a post from a friend of mine that deals with the question as laid out by Durham and Gillespie:

Let's start with Durham on Scandal:

"Chap 6: Holding forth the difficulty mainly in pracitce, and shewing how far offence ought to have influence on a Christian in his walk."

Durham proceeds in making careful distinctions/qualifications via 3 assertions (I'll be including 2):

1. Necessary duties.

2. Things of light concernment in themselves (the context will evidence a sense of things not inherently necessary)

"1. For no offence whatsoever should men forbear a necessary duty, or commit any thing which is materially sinful. Christ would needs go up to Jerusalem, altho' his Disciples were displeased, and would continue in preaching the Gospel, and in doing what was intrusted to him, altho' the Pharisees were offended, Matt 15. This is clear: For no Evil should be done that Good may come of it, Rom 3.

2. Assert. Yet in other things there ought to be great respect had to offence, and men ought to be swayed accordingly in their practice, as the former Reasons clear; As, 1. If the matter be of light concernment in itself, as how mens Gestures are in their walking, (Suppse in walking softly, or quickly with Cloke or without) Men ought to do or abstain as may prevent the Contruction of Pride, Lightness, etc. or give occasion to others in any of these: Of such sort are salutations in the very manner of them. Of this sort was women praying with their heads uncovered amongst the Corinthians, it being then taken for an evil sign; yet if it be necessary, there is nothing little, as moses will not leave an hoof, Exodus 10, nor Mordecai bow his knee to Haman, because it that it looked like fauning on an accursed enemy: Of this Sort also are offences in the fasions of Clothes, as some Mens wearing Ribbons, and such like, which being of small Concernment, ought certainly to be regulated by Offence" - Durham's treatise concerning scandal, pg 24; Ch 6 Part 1.

The 1st assertion deals with necessary duties. The 2nd, however, deals with things of another nature (things of light concernement, etc). This fact alone demonstrates how Durham interpreted the nature of the practice, without question. This section should be interpreted as a qualifier in reference to Durham's comments on 1st Corinthians 11 in "The Law Unsealed." Appealing to historical practice in Scotland, or anywhere else is fallacious (in this context); an instance of question begging. The question is not in reference to the practice historically, but in reference to the nature of the historical practice. If this method was not assumed when examining historical accounts, one by consequence would terminate in a thousand superstitious conclusions...perhaps an infinite number of conclusions.

The covering is either necessary inherently, or not. Durham excludes the covering from the category of inherently necessary duties, and squarely places it in a category of a different nature - "Yet in other things......If the matter be of light concernment.....Of such Sort are salutations in the very manner of them. Of this Sort was womens praying with their heads uncovered amongst the Corinthians, it being then taken for an evil sign, etc" Therefore, etc. Durham is clearly dealing with contextually qualified necessities in this section, rather than things inherently necessary.

To avoid the charge of redundancy, there are different applications of necessity. Some duties are necessary inherently, as Durham's 1st assertion clears. Some duties are contextually necessary, as in the instances mentioned in his 2nd assertion...being qualified by the context. Durham judiciously elaborates on this idea a bit further along in the chapter: "If it be indifferent, that is, in the matter thereof, such as may be done, or forborn; as eating or not eating such a meat for such a time, (for altho' no Action is indifferent when it is done, because the Circumstance of the End, Motive and manner, do determine them either to be good or bad, as they are agreeable or disagreeable to the law when they are done; yet some Acitons in themselves are such:)...."

"Nature" is often amplified as universally assuming the idea of unalterability. No doubt, it certainly carries this sense, yet not universally. "Moral" may be amplified as assuming a universal and absolute sense as well. No doubt, it certainly carries this sense, though not in every expression of moral principle (see Durham's latter qualifications; see also Rutherford's dispute concerning Scandal - found at the end of 'The Divine Right of Church Government & Excommunication' ).

Gillespie in English Popish Ceremonies:

"As for the veils wherewith the Apostle would have women covered whilst they were praying (that is, in their hearts following the public common prayer), they are worthy to be covered with shame as with a garment who allege this example for sacred significant ceremonies of human institution. This covering was a moral sign for that comely and orderly distinction of men and women which civil decency required in all their meetings; wherefore that distinction of habits which they used for decency and comliness in their common behavior and conversation, the Apostle will have them for the same decency and comliness, still to retain in their holy assemblies." - pg 254.

Note Gillespie's description of the nature of the practice; it was something used in their "common behavior and conversations." On the very next page, Gillepie identifies the sense in which he is using these terms, in reference to alterable circumstances:

"Alas! what sorry conceit is this? Divines, indeed, do rightly require that those *alterable circumstances* of divine worship which are left to the determination of the church be so *ordered and disposed* as they may be profitable to this edification. ** But this edification they speak of is no other than that which is common to all our actions and speeches** "

"Actions and speeches" are merely synonyms for "behavior and conversation."

A few questions:

Of what nature does Gillespie descibe the woman's veil?

A. He descibes it as something common to the Corinthians' behavior and conversation.

Of what nature does Gillespie define things that are common to our actions and speeches/behavior and conversation"?

A. He defines them as alterable circumstances of divine worship which are left to the determination of the church to be ordered and disposed as it may be profitable to edification.

Hence, there are two things common to our actions and speeches:

1. Things universally received; unalterable and absolutely obligatory in all contexts (see Gillespie's use of the term 'common to societies' in this former sense....in 'Wholesome severity reconciled with Christian liberty')

2. Things contextually qualified, and defined as alterable circumstances common to actions and speeches/behavior and conversation.

The latter is the context in which Gillespie is describing the woman's veil, without question.

Gillespie further defines:

"And further, the Apostle shows that it is also a natural sign, and that nature itself teaches it; therefore he urges it both by the inferiority or subjection of the woman (vs 3, 8, 9; for covering was then a sign of subjection) [here Gillespie assumes morality applied in a 'contextually qualified' sense at point-blank range - NS], and by the long hair which nature gives to a woman (vs. 25); where he would have the artificial covering to be fasioned in imitation of the natural."

In reference to natural e xpressions, we find that Gillespie applies natural significations as well to things such as Kneeling, standing, lifting the eyes and hands, etc.

"Now, besides the sacred signs of God's own institution, we know that natural signs have also a place in divine worship; thus kneeling in time of prayer signifies the submission of our hearts and minds, the lifting up of our eyes and hands signifies the elevation of our affections; the rending of the garments signified the rending of the heart by sorrow; standing with a religious suspect to that which is before us signifies veneration or reverence, sitting at table signifies familiarity and fellowship [elabaration on in what sense this is necessary as it is applied to the Lord's supper, we can perhaps discuss as well...very interesting principles in operation - NS]....All these signs have their signification from nature." - pg 248

Gillespie distinguished 3 sorts of signs before this section:

1. Natural signs

2. Customable signs

3. Voluntary signs

None of these signs assume a necessary element of unalterability and absolute moral obligation, but to the contrary, are applied to things within the section that obviously do not possess such attributes (as Gillespie has clearly shown).

E xpressions of natural principle do not necessarily assume a universal and absolute (unalterable) nature, but as in many instances, are found in habits/customs/manners/gestures that "vary, ebb, flow, and alter according to Civil Government's laws, manners, customs of men"; instances that are in no way inherently moral, nor universally received - but necessary in a contextually qualified sense (See Rutherford's comments - Divine right of church government and excommunication, pg 1-7, 89, 90...more on how some have distorted at least one of these sections of Rutherford later, if time permits).

Rending the garment is a natural sign, though not inherent, nor morally obligatory in the expression of sorrow - yet having its signification from nature, and not an unalterable e xpression, as with standing, lifting the eyes and hands, etc.

Again, "Nature" is often amplified as universally assuming the idea of unalterability. It certainly carries this sense, yet not universally. "Moral" may be amplified as assuming a universal and absolute sense as well. No doubt, it certainly carries this sense, though not in every expression of moral principle.

The woman's veil is called a moral sign. In this context, the use of the term "moral" does not assume an unalterable sense, but was as well applied to the kiss of charity by Gillespie in the very paragraph before the veils were mentioned:

"Concerning the kiss of charity used in those times (2 Cor. 13:12), we say in like manner tht it was but a moral sign of that reconciliation, friendship and amity, which showed itself as well at holy assemblies as other meetings in that kind and courtesy, but with all chaste salutation (see Durham's comments on salutations), which was then in use."

Next paragraph:

"As for the veils wherewith the Apostle would have women covered whilst they were praying (that is, in their hearts following the public common prayer), they are worthy to be covered with shame as with a garment who allege this example for sacred significant ceremonies of human institution. This covering was a moral sign for that comely and orderly distinction of men and women which civil decency required in all their meetings; wherefore that distinction of habits which they used for decency and comliness in their common behavior and coversation, the Apostle will have them for the same decency and comliness, still to retain in their holy assemblies." - pg 254.

Gillespie also applies the term "moral sign" to the love feasts used in the primitive church, which were used for mutual charity, and further evidencing the alterablility of the practice by obviously assuming they were an element of past history, in no way obligatory in the 17th century context.



Gillespie also applies the term to the rite Abraham commanded his servant to use when swearing, when putting his hand under his thigh (Gen 24:2)...calling it a moral sign of civil subjection, reverence and fidelity which inferiors owe to superiors - pg 251 EPC (compare with Rutherford's comments on the nature of the Corinthians' covering - pg 90 Divine Right of Church Government).

So, in these correctly qualified senses, the covering is both a moral sign of subjection, and has its signification from nature:

1. As an e xpression of submission (for covering was then a sign of submission).

2. As an e xpression of the long hair that God gives to women by nature (where Paul will have the artificial covering fasioned in imitation of the natural).

Those who interpret Gillespie as if he were referring to practices of an unalterable nature, have to be consistent, and interpret the other references in the same light. Context is critical, and logical consistency is inescapable. Such interpretations should, in all consistency, be evidenced in their present practice.

Seeing as these men were ministers of the highest reputation in Scotland, I can only conclude they (in their ministrations) applied the assumptions underlying their practice according to these same assumptions. In other words, the application (historical practice) was not inconsistent with their assumed principles, but the very fruition of these principles as applied in civil and ecclesiastical contexts. These books were public as well. If the contrary position was historically accurate, I can't imagine it would have gone unoticed before the General assembly of the Church of Scotland.